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Abstract: Must banks match asset and liability maturities, as William Barnett and 
Walter E. Block (2009, 2011) as well as Ivan Jankovic (2011) surmise? While we agree 
with these authors that issuances of fiduciary media breed financial instability, we 
disagree that maturity transformation represents such a case. Maturity transformation — 
otherwise known as borrowing short-term and lending long-term — guided by several base 
legal principles, does not result in the issuance of fiduciary media. Most notable among 
these principles is that any credit issued must be funded by borrowing of a positive 
duration, i.e., not via a demand deposit. We demonstrate that two factors instigate larger 
degrees of maturity transformation than would otherwise be the case, breeding potential 
instability: a continual increase in the credit supply and the provision of a lender of last 
resort. We also show that the interest rate is a natural stabilizing brake on the over-
issuance of longer-dated credit against short-term financing. 
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Must banks abide by the “golden rule” of banking, as Ludwig von Mises (1971, 263) surmised? 
While this golden rule — that a bank’s obligations must not fall due on a date prior to their 
corresponding claims — has existed since at least Otto Hübner (1854, 28), the idea contradicts 
what is widely seen as a the primary role of modern banking institutions (Freixas and Rochet 2008, 
4). The practice exists today under various guises, including maturity transformation, maturity 
mismatching, and borrowing short-term and lending long-term.  
Maturity transformation by the banking industry has been widely seen as a leading cause of 
the resultant instability in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (Brunnermeier 2009). When 
regulatory measures failed to halt destabilizing investment activities, the collective maturity 
transformation of the banking industry left the monetary and fiscal authorities with little choice 
but to facilitate refinancing as the crisis progressed, lest the banking system succumb to a 
contagious series of insolvencies (Farhi and Tirole 2012). The on-demand nature of a bank’s 
liabilities (e.g., demand deposits) exposes it to illiquidity if a sufficient amount of withdrawals 
exhausts its reserve assets. Alternatively, the par-value nature of the bank’s liabilities implies that it 
can become insolvent (both cash flow and balance sheet) if its assets lose a sufficient amount of 
value on the market. While these common problems with maturity transformation are mitigated 
through deposit insurance, larger issues remain. On one hand, from a depositor’s point-of-view, 
bouts of illiquidity brought about by maturity transformation disrupt banking services and 
potentially leave them unable to access their funds when the need arises. Since the government 
backstops the deposit insurance plan, bank instability often negatively affects its financing. (In 
addition to its deposit insurance fund, the FDIC holds a $500-billion line of credit with the U.S. 
Treasury in case emergency funding is required.) On the other hand, runs on deposits increase 
regulatory scrutiny for all banks in the industry, even for those not directly affected by the turmoil. 
To the extent that bank employees can see their employment situation worsen in the event of a 
bank failure, they too have reason to be cautious of maturity transformation. 
What all these scenarios have in common is that the most basic of bank practices — maturity 
transformation — raises the alarm for individuals and entities both directly and indirectly 
associated with banking. In its defense, maturity transformation gives deposit banks the 
opportunity to offer low-cost services as revenues are generated from investment activities instead 
of strictly relying on customer fees. Taken together, the heightened awareness of the costs of 
maturity transformation gives credence to the possibility that the cost-benefit analysis of the 
practice is in need of reassessment. One way to proceed with this reassessment is to return to 
Hübner’s “golden rule” and uncover the relationship between bank assets and liabilities.  
The original considerations as to why the golden rule was created are now long forgotten, but 
the relationship between the practice and the business cycle is gaining attention. Much of the 
literature on the topic settles on a corner solution: Either maturity transformation is an essential 
bank activity that must continue, lest the industry be jeopardized, or it is a complication for 
economic calculation, and is thus a potential instigator of the business cycle (Jankovic 2011). We 
challenge both these claims. Maturity transformation will only foster economic instability under 
certain conditions. These conditions are not strictly economic in origin. Instead, an appeal must 
be made to a property rights analysis to determine when the practice is legally permissible and 
economically beneficial. We also show that banks, which are fully responsible for and cognizant of 
the risks of the practice, will not instigate the business cycle.  
 
Maturity Transformation: Much Ado About When Money’s Due 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the recent recession was due to (at least, in part) excessive 
maturity mismatching by the banking sector (Goodhart 2008). This problem is not new, nor has 
its ill effects evaded attention. 
Several recent cases are pertinent. Swap lines opened by the Fed and other central banks 
during the crisis gave banks access to short-term funding necessary to meet their short-term 
obligations (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor 2008). In the absence of such liquidity provisions, 
banks’ liabilities would have come due prior to their ability to liquidate assets of sufficient quantity 
to stave off insolvency. In what was perhaps the most extreme case of instability, the nation of 
Iceland succumbed to insolvency as it tried bailing out its banking sector faced with this maturity 
transformation-induced liquidity constraint (Bagus and Howden 2011; Howden 2013a, 2013b). 
The bank runs in late 2008, exemplified by Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, were an 
example of the effects of this practice in extremis (Shin 2009). Using depositors’ funds to finance 
longer-term projects, banks were caught in a liquidity squeeze as liabilities of zero maturity (i.e., 
those available on demand) were being claimed against assets of positive maturity (i.e., those 
requiring some time to liquidate). Banks were unable to liquidate assets quickly enough to meet 
redemption demands when the demand for money increased rapidly. More recently, during the 
Eurozone crisis, depositors have been moving savings out of unstable countries — primarily the 
European periphery — and depositing their funds in the perceived safety of core-European banks 
(Slater 2012).1 
That the problem is not new can be seen in the prescriptions recommended to deal with such 
liquidity constraints from bygones past. Henry Thornton (1802) and Walter Bagehot (1873) 
advocated the lender-of-last-resort facility to save banks stricken with just such misfortune. Under 
such schemes, however, credit would only be made available to those banks that were solvent if 
given enough time, and thus only suffering from a temporary lack of liquidity. While the lender-of-
last-resort function rectifies the apparent problem of undercapitalized banks suffering a run on 
their assets, it does little to remove the incentive creating the run in the first place. To remove this 
incentive, D.W. Diamond and P.H. Dybvig (1983) recommend deposit insurance as the optimal 
response to a fractional-reserve banking system that continually faces redemption threats. By 
removing ex ante the threat that a deposit will not be honored in the future, deposit insurance 
should result in fewer — or, optimally, no — bank runs. 
Unfortunately, both of these methods to deal with liquidity-constrained banks have their 
drawbacks. It is difficult for regulators to distinguish illiquid yet solvent banks from illiquid and 
insolvent ones. In the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, over 90 percent of emergency loans 
from the Federal Reserve went to financial institutions that eventually failed (Kaufmann 1999). 
Moral hazard is the most commonly cited issue with bailouts and insurance plans (Benston and 
Kaufman 1996; Kaufmann 1996). Removing the threat of depositor losses also removes the 
incentive for depositors to monitor their bank’s stability (Ely 1999). Historical evidence bears 
witness to insured and guaranteed banking systems succumbing to riskier lending and less prudent 
asset management (Thies and Gerlowski 1989).  
All of these destabilizing cases are brought by the same root problem — bank assets with a 
longer maturity than their corresponding liabilities. The nature of banking contracts is often the 
central issue determining banking stability (Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor 1998). Since banks 
typically contract their liabilities for a shorter maturity than their assets, redemption requests leave 
the potential to make binding an — albeit temporary — liquidity constraint. In none of the 
aforementioned cases, however, is it clear that the problem is the maturity transformation. Indeed, 
given appropriate constraints, maturity mismatching is sustainable and beneficial. 
 
Conditions for Sustainable Maturity Transformation 
 
The first question to address when assessing the practice of maturity transformation is whether the 
relevant parties are endowed with the rights to facilitate such activity. In particular, and following 
Jesús Huerta de Soto (2006) and Philipp Bagus and David Howden (2009, 2013), we approach the 
problem by looking at the contracts governing such transactions.  
Any transfer of property from one individual to another with the expectation of the 
transaction being reversed in the future can broadly fit into one of two categories: a deposit or a 
loan. Each is nonspecific in that it can involve either specific or fungible goods. Each entails the 
physical transfer of property, and the duration of the transfer can range from the very short term 
to the very long term. There are three significant economic differences between the two contracts 
that define them (Huerta de Soto 2006, ch. 1; Bagus and Howden 2009, 2013).  
First, a loan contract exchanges a present good for a claim to a future good. A lender lends 
money which the borrower pledges to repay in the future. In distinction, under deposit contracts 
there is no such intertemporal exchange of goods (Mises 1971, 269). The depositor retains at all 
times a claim on the deposited good, and thus makes no such exchange for a future good. As a 
corollary, depositories do not gain the money that is deposited in them, but must instead keep it 
on hand for the depositor to claim on demand. 
The second difference is that loan contracts necessarily involve the transfer of the asset’s 
availability. In a money loan, for example, the lender sacrifices the availability and use of the 
money for the duration stipulated by the loan. The borrower is thus at liberty to use the money as 
he/she wishes, only under the constraint that it be returned before the contract’s duration. 
Deposits do not entail this same transfer of use, as the depositor has made the deposit under the 
pretense of keeping the asset available at all times. 
Finally, while loan contracts always involve an inter-temporal exchange of goods, deposit 
contracts are a-temporal. This is significant, as a temporal contract results in a value spread due to 
the uncertainty of the completion of the contract’s terms in the future (Shackle 1967, 203). The 
uncertainty inherent in the as-yet-to-be-completed contract necessitates remuneration. As a result, 
the lender will be remunerated for relinquishing the use and availability of his/her good for the 
duration of the contract, typically explicitly through an interest payment. Depositories must be 
remunerated for holding the depositor’s assets, commonly through a fee.2 
These economic differences are not without ramifications. They result in three significant 
legal differences, which shape the range of activities that one may undertake with these assets.  
First, the contracts represent distinct legal purposes. As a loan represents the transfer of 
property, it also represents the borrower’s gain of the use of the asset. Since a deposit is not 
undertaken with the intent to transfer property, the depository is prohibited from using the asset. 
Such practice is common in deposit contracts for other types of goods, both fungible and specific. 
The prohibition on using the contents of safety deposit boxes is an example in the case of specific 
goods. Similarly, specific laws against grain elevators making use of deposited wheat have been 
enforced by U.S. law since the 1860s (Williams 1984). Money deposits are treated separately under 
the common law since the 1848 ruling in Foley v. Hill, after which the British House of Lords 
“finally declared demand deposits with banks to be loans to the bankers” (Kim 2013, 812).  
Countries resting on a civil law tradition are ambivalent on the issue. For example, Germany de 
facto chooses to not enforce its laws prohibiting the use of a deposit by a bank (Köhler 2013, 916-
920), while in Spain such legal prohibition is only partially enforced (Bagus, Howden and Gabriel 
2015; Huerta de Soto 2006, 125-129). At any rate, legal ambiguities do not negate the underlying 
legal necessity that depositories and depositors must have the same end in mind when forming a 
contract (i.e., there must be a “meeting of the minds”).3 
Second, loan contracts must establish a maximum duration before it must be reversed (even if 
only implicitly, as in Bagus, Howden and Gabriel 2015). A good “loaned” for no time is a deposit. 
A good “loaned” for an unlimited period is a gift. The intermediary cases where goods are loaned 
for finite periods are those that concern the loan contract. Loans must have a finite maturity to 
give meaning to the claim to a future good. There is no way to do a cost-benefit analysis with 
regard to the attractiveness of a loan’s terms lacking a maximum waiting period for the lender to 
access his/her claim to a future good.4 
The final legal difference concerns the obligations involved. These obligations differ as per the 
type of contract entered into (deposit or loan), and by the type of good contracted for (specific or 
fungible). Specific goods under loan must be returned in their same state (or a pre-stipulated one) 
at the contract’s termination. These contracts are known as commodatum contracts. If the good 
under contract is fungible, the result is a mutuum contract. In such a case, it is only important that 
an equivalent quantity and quality of contracted units be returned upon the contract’s duration. 
These units become the tantundem of the loan, which must be remitted to the lender to terminate 
the contract.  
Deposit contracts cannot entail this same legal requirement, as the good in question must 
remain under custody. In other words, it is not possible to repay for the use of the good when the 
termination of the transaction is defined as the return of the original deposited good to its owner. 
A distinction will still exist between specific and fungible goods. Specific goods, like a document 
deposited in a safety deposit box, must be returned upon request to terminate the deposit contract. 
Fungible goods, like money in a deposit account, may be returned in the form of an equal quantity 
and quality of money units, again, the tantundem. Note that the use of a deposited good during the 
contract’s duration, even if the good can still be returned upon termination, is considered a breach 
of contract. If an individual places a diamond ring in a safety deposit box at a bank, the bank is 
culpable for breach of contract if they remove and use that ring during the contracted period, even 
if they return it safely to the depositor upon the termination of the contract. Safekeeping is the key 
role of the depository. 
These three legal distinctions provide for different types of activities that may be pursued with 
an asset, dependent on the manner in which the asset was originally obtained. While depositories 
are limited in what they may legally do with the deposited assets, loans create a different story. As 
the only obligation that a borrower has is to return either the specific loaned good or its tantundem 
upon the loan’s termination, no legal obligation dictates what activities the borrower can use the 
good for in the interim. While it is certainly risky for a lender to lend under such legal conditions, 
they are remunerated for the risks of such activity (in opposition to the depositor, who pays for 
such analogous services). Caveat commodator becomes the lender’s warning. 
 
Risks and Consequences of Maturity Transformation 
 
The legalese of different contracts might be but a footnote of economic trivia if it was not for the 
repercussions on the financial system. The contractual obligations created imply that banks and 
other financial intermediaries are constrained in the way they can use their funding and for what.  
Deposited funds cannot legally be “loaned” out or used by the depository. The reason is 
simple: deposited funds cannot be considered the property of the depository. Consequently, the 
depository (i.e., bank) is not entitled to make use of these deposits. Loans (e.g., certificates of 
deposit or other time deposits) are a different story. Despite claims to the contrary (Barnett and 
Block 2009, 2011), there is no legal argument as to why loaned funds cannot be employed by the 
borrower. There is also no reason why the loaned funds cannot be employed knowing that they 
will not be made available until a time after the loan contract’s duration. The only legal stipulation 
is that the loan be repaid on or before its maturity, with no concern given to the means through 
which it will be repaid.  
As a practical matter, it is difficult to discern which lending activities are supported by loans 
secured by the bank, and which are funded through its depositors. Since money is fungible, it is 
impossible to distinguish the funding source of any lending activity. Any individual bank can 
discern the nature of its lending activities, but since loaned deposits are re-deposited throughout 
the banking system (i.e., through the money multiplier), in the aggregate, there is no knowledge as 
to the origin of deposited sums (Howden 2010). In the decade prior to 2008, the M1 money 
multiplier averaged 1.75, implying that banks issued loans and fiduciary media in excess of their 
core deposits by 75 percent. With the increase in reserves following the financial crisis, the money 
multiplier has decreased to around 0.75, implying that banks are holding more reserves than their 
deposit base.  
Some authors worry that loaning out funds for a maturity past that which they are due will 
promote economic instability (Barnett and Block 2011; Jankovic 2011). In light of the apparent 
liquidity constraints on banks during the latest financial crisis, this is not an unreasonable 
conclusion. Yet, such instability will not necessarily arise due to two reasons. 
First, an issuance of fiduciary media has the potential to breed general economic instability 
(Hülsmann 2009).5 Fiduciary media consists of any perfect money substitute that is not backed 
fully by the monetary base (Huerta de Soto 2006, 187). Today, this primarily takes the form of 
demand deposits within the fractional-reserve banking system. A common argument equates 
maturity mismatching with the issuance of fiduciary media (Jankovic 2011, 121). While this is true 
if the collateralizing assets are redeemable on demand, the situation is much different for maturity 
mismatching loans of distinct durations. In the latter case, no fiduciary media is issued as the 
transaction is one of issuing credit against borrowed credit. With no created fiduciary media, there 
is no monetary trigger to set in motion the business cycle. 
The second reason concerns the risk of the practice. While maturity mismatching has no legal 
roadblocks, it is undoubtedly a risky exercise. For fungible assets like money, the risk is usually 
only a relative one in that profits are affected without necessarily endangering solvency. This arises 
because a bank that has loaned out borrowed funds can access additional funds on the loans 
market to finance its obligations as they come due, even if it may not be at an advantageous 
borrowing rate. In this case a bank’s bottom line might be compromised, but barring anything 
similar to a “sudden stop” (Calvo 1998), where loans of an appropriate maturity are no longer 
available at any price, solvency will not be threatened. Lending money in this case is not only 
caveat commodator, but also caveat mutuodor.  
The risk of borrowing short-term and lending long-term is mitigated via two conditions. First, 
when the money supply is increasing, the future availability of money is increased relative to the 
present availability. For a bank that knowingly lends today against future borrowing, it is apparent 
that maturity mismatching will be promoted accordingly with the reduction in risk that future 
borrowing will not be available. The second condition is the provision of a lender of last resort. If 
an institution — such as a central bank or government treasury — exists with an explicit purpose to 
bail out illiquid institutions, the risk of maturity mismatching assets and liabilities decreases. This 
general socialization of losses, but privatization of gains from the practice, promotes its occurrence. 
Financial intermediaries, secure in knowing that funds will be forthcoming should they be unable 
to roll over their financing, will participate in an increased amount of the risky practice (Bagus and 
Howden 2010, 75-78). In most developed economies, a central bank functions (at least, implicitly) 
as a lender of last resort to aid illiquid banks in just such instances.6 
If a central bank with lender-of-last-resort facilities promotes the practice of maturity 
transformation, one could ask what consequences await a banking system lacking an institution 
with this role. In such cases, the interest rate serves an additional purpose in moderating the 
practice. Originary interest rates are well-known to coordinate inter-temporal activities, as well as 
equilibrate planned saving with investment. The originary interest rate is the product of the 
uncertainty inherent between the present and some future date. To the extent that the borrower’s 
future availability to repay a loan is uncertain, a premium is established in the present.  
Of the factors that are added to the originary rate to achieve the market rate of interest, we are 
primarily concerned with the risk premium. Lenders, aware of the practice of maturity 
transformation, demand a risk premium from borrowers in addition to what they would charge for 
a less risky, maturity-matched use of the funds. This effect serves as an interest rate brake on the 
practice, especially pronounced in an environment lacking a continual increase in credit 
availability, or a lender of last resort. The effect of this brake intensifies with strengthening the 
degree of maturity transformation undertaken at any point in time. If more funds are loaned out 
than the bank has maturing in any period, it will have to borrow additional funds to make up the 
difference. This implies that the future demand to borrow funds will increase as present lending 
increases. Ceteris paribus, this places upward pressure on future interest rates, and forward-looking 
lenders discount these higher future rates back to the present.7 The net effect is that borrowers will 
need to pay higher rates in the present to finance their lending, and this effect is more pronounced 
as the disparity between present borrowing and present lending deepens. 
In this way the interest rate takes on a twofold “braking” role. Interest rates serve to limit 
overinvestment by increasing in response to an increased demand for borrowed funds. As a result, 
an exogenous shock to the economy — in the form of a technological advancement, for example — 
cannot result in an over- or mal-investment-type boom-bust cycle. Interest rates will increase in 
response to an increased demand for borrowing funds, thus slowing the rate of adoption and 
keeping the structure of production from unduly deepening (Garrison 2001, 60). Note that this 
does not negatively affect the development of technological advancement. This advancement was 
the original force that caused interest rates to increase, and this increase in the rate will not inhibit 
its appearance. Friedrich A. Hayek (1933, 94, 179) referred to this phenomenon as the “interest 
rate brake” that would allow investment to proceed while signaling to entrepreneurs when the 
economy was beginning to overheat. The interest rate serves as the intertemporal coordinator of 
production plans, assuring that the duration of production processes is aligned with the supply of 
real savings. In addition, we can now see that the interest rate serves as a coordinator of borrowing, 
ensuring that the present supply of loanable funds is balanced against its expected future supply. 
However, this does not mean that the present and future funds’ supplies must be equal, but only 
that the interest rate will coordinate the redemptions and availabilities of such funds in a 
sustainable manner (Garrison 2004). 
The interest rate brake works to motivate financial intermediaries to transform maturities up 
to a finite and sustainable amount. The interest rate then serves to maintain two equilibria. On 
one hand, the rate coordinates inter-temporal transactions. On the other hand, the rate serves to 
ensure that financial intermediaries use the funds that they have in their possession, and are legally 
permitted to use (i.e., loans), in a responsible and sustainable manner.  
 Conclusion 
 
Hübner was not altogether incorrect when he reckoned that bank’s liabilities should not fall due 
prior to their funding. However, his “golden rule” of banking was limited to a special case. 
Financial intermediaries are only legally permitted to use funds transferred to them. In 
modern banking contracts, such transfers are typically in the form of short-term loans or time-
deposit accounts. With these funds, the bank is allowed to issue credit in excess of the funding 
available, as well as for a longer duration than the funding is projected to be available for. That this 
practice is risky is largely outside the scope of economic analysis. More important are three notes 
about this practice: 
 
1. Continual increases in the credit supply reduce the risk inherent in the practice of maturity 
transformation and thus promote it beyond what would otherwise be obtained. 
2. The feature of a lender of last resort in the economy allows financial intermediaries to 
socialize some of the risk inherent in the practice, while securing the resultant profits. The 
lender of last resort thus promotes the practice of maturity transformation. 
3. An interest rate brake then serves to equilibrate the demand for present borrowing with the 
expected future supply of lending necessary to sustain it. For this brake to function effectively, 
both the continual increase in the credit supply and the lender-of-last-resort function must be 
removed completely from the economy.  
 
We should note that Hübner was correct in one regard. The golden rule of banking is 
applicable to the deposit obligations of a bank. A bank is not at liberty to use funds that have not 
been loaned to it, along with the accompanying transfer of use rights. Today, these obligations 
exist mostly in the form of demand deposits. As deposits lack maturity, they must be available 
continually on demand. This necessarily implies that banks are not entitled to lend out such funds 
in a practice that can be characterized as maturity transformation in extremis.  
Lamentably, today’s financial world does not abide by the laws we describe here. Banks are 
permitted to legally lend against their demand deposits, albeit constrained by a reserve ratio in 
some jurisdictions. The lender of last resort exists in almost every developed economy. Continual 
increases in the credit supply have rendered the practice relatively riskless, and promoted its use to 
the levels that we currently see. In this regard, economists like Barnett and Block (2009, 2011) and 
Jankovic (2011) are partially correct to decry the practice. But the part that they should decry is not 
the practice of maturity transformation as such, provided that it functions within a set of 
guidelines. Most importantly, as long as a bank loans only against money that has been loaned to 
it, there is no legal issue. 
We endeavor to create a clear imperative in placing the responsibility of economic instability 
on the proper culprits. Socialized financial losses via a lender of last resort have removed the threat 
of illiquidity and eventual insolvency for many financial institutions. The continual expansion of 
credit has removed the risk that future funds will not be available to borrow when the time arises 
to finance the borrowing done in the present. Rectifying these two issues will largely mitigate any 




1 Other factors are relevant besides the ability of banks to honor redemption requests on 
demand. In Greece’s recent history, the outflow of money is partly caused by this reason, although 
it is also a reaction against expected capital controls prohibiting depositors from moving their 
money to safer banking systems in the future, as was the case in Cyprus in 2013. 
2 If a fee is not explicitly stated, the depository is including the service at a loss which it will, 
optimistically, recoup through other business activities (Bagus and Howden  2009, 400 fn5). 
3 While the specific legal obligations heaped on depositories are a question for the legal 
system, the existing framework of the law does not necessarily have to be correct or optimal (Bagus, 
Howden and Block 2013), whether through faulty logic in constructing laws in civil law 
jurisdictions, or as a result of poor case precedents in areas subject to common law.  
4 That in practice there is a continuum of availabilities is of no immediate concern to us here. 
Philipp Bagus and David Howden (2012b) address this issue, arguing that even if availabilities are 
only vaguely defined, the legal system is the appropriate institution to determine whether money 
has been deposited or loaned. 
5 Typically, economic disruptions put in motion by issuances of fiduciary media fall under the 
category of Austrian Business Cycles (Garrison 2001; Hayek 1935; Mises 1971; Rothbard 1962). 
Either the schema of relative prices is upset (Mises 1928, 100-103), or entrepreneurial knowledge 
of the origin or sustainability of the new money is lost as fiduciary media is issued (Howden 2010). 
In either case, inter-temporal consumption and investment plans are upset, thus breeding 
instability in the real economy. Alternatively, one could view the rise in interest rates on the eve of 
the business cycle’s bust phase as a response to the expectations of falling income and a withdrawal 
of loanable funds from the market.  
6 By promoting this destabilizing practice, the central bank creates a net negative welfare effect 
on the economy. In addition, it also causes a situation that necessitates its facilities to create 
fiduciary media. By engendering economic instability, central banks create the appearance that it is 
necessary to provide credit to keep the system liquid (Bagus and Howden 2012a, sec. 3). 
7 Included among these cetera is a lack of a lender of last resort. One result of this function is 
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